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It is often claimed that theory of mind (ToM) is facilitated by pretend play (PP), or by a particular
type of PP, social pretend play (SPP). Here we challenge that view, proposing instead that ToM
might be useful for driving SPP, rather than the reverse. We discuss background theory, review
pertinent studies, and explain why the “ToM first” view is at least equally likely.
The first form of pretend to consider is solitary PP, emerging at 12–18 months, in which
one engages in three basic types of transformation: substitutes one object for another, projects
imaginary characteristics onto objects, and imagines situations that do not exist (Leslie, 1987). The
second form is social pretend play (SPP), which involves the same basic transformations but occurs
with others, and emerges around age 3. We address these two forms of PP consecutively.
There is a fundamental similarity, or isomorphism (Leslie, 1987), between PP and ToM. For
all three types of transformation just described, PP involves projecting a different reality onto
a situation, all while knowing what the real situation is (Lillard, 1993). For example, a child
might mentally project a telephone onto a banana, engaging in both of the first two types
of transformation. Similarly, understanding false belief—a foundational skill in ToM—involves
understanding that someone is projecting a different reality onto a situation, when one knows what
the real situation is. For example, a child might see someone as mentally projecting a chocolate bar
inside a drawer, while the chocolate bar is actually in the cupboard.
Theoretically, then, the ability to imagine a situation that differs from one’s present reality
underlies both PP and understanding others’ minds, in particular, false belief (Leslie, 1987; Flavell,
1988; Forguson and Gopnik, 1988; Moses and Chandler, 1992). Leslie (1987) argued that the
cognitive architecture that enables one to engage in PP also enables one to understand false belief,
suggesting that PP should be related to ToM.
Hence it is possible that PP engenders ToM by giving children practice at projecting
representations that differ from reality onto that reality. In pursuit of evidence on this point,
many researchers have examined the correlation between PP and ToM. For example, Taylor
and Carlson (1997) assessed preschoolers’ PP sophistication by examining their tendency to use
imaginary objects in pretend action sequences (e.g., holding an imaginary toothbrush to brush
one’s teeth rather than using a finger as a toothbrush). The researchers examined whether this more
sophisticated form of PP correlated with children’s performance on standard ToM assessments.
However, across many studies, findings are inconsistent: Although some observe significant
relationships (Suddendorf et al., 1999; Nielsen and Dissanayake, 2000) others do not, even with the
same measures and very similar samples (Schwebel et al., 1999; Lillard, 2001b). Even within studies
that found that solitary PP and ToM were related, inconsistency was observed among measures.
For example, Taylor and Carlson (1997) found that ToM correlated with self- but not object-
directed pretense, and Lalonde and Chandler (1995) found a significant relationship for “engages in
simple make-belief actions alone” but not for “uses . . . objects for make-believe activities alone” (p.
395). Cumulatively, these inconsistent findings undermine the idea of a reliable causal relationship
between solitary PP and ToM.
This brings us to the second type of PP, social PP. When children engage in SPP, they pretend
to be other people with distinct thoughts and emotions. A major theory of how we understand
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others’ minds, simulation theory, suggests that pretending to
be someone else aids ToM because it gives children practice
in simulating others’ mental states and imagining oneself in
another’s shoes (Harris, 1995). If pretending to be others does
involve suchmetarepresentations, it would be expected to predict
ToM (Lillard, 2001a).
Indeed, researchers often find correlations between SPP and
ToM. For example, Astington and Jenkins (1995) assessed the
sophistication of preschoolers’ pretend play through coding
their explicit role assignments (e.g., “I’ll be the mommy”) and
joint proposals (e.g., “Let’s go to the store”). These behaviors
were associated with children’s ToM. Several earlier studies are
also consistent with these findings (Rubin and Maioni, 1975;
Connolly andDoyle, 1984; Peisach andHardeman, 1985; Lalonde
and Chandler, 1995). Another type of SPP is having an imaginary
companion. When children postulate imagined beings, they
must represent those beings’ mental states. Indeed, Taylor and
Carlson (1997) found correlations between having an imaginary
companion and ToM (see also Giménez-Dasí et al., 2014).
However, just as for PP, results are inconsistent (Cole and
LaVoie, 1985). Some of the same studies that find positive
relationships for certain ToM measures report null results for
other measures. For example, in the studies cited above, PP
correlated with spatial but not affective perspective taking (Rubin
and Maioni, 1975), affective but not cognitive perspective taking
(Connolly and Doyle, 1984), and to appearance reality but not
false belief (Schwebel et al., 1999). Other research revealed
inconsistent relationships between ToM and different pretense
measures. For example, although Youngblade and Dunn (1995)
found that ToM was related to role enactment, it was not related
to explicit role assignments, in contrast to Astington and Jenkins
(1995), who found that ToM was related to joint proposals and
role assignments but not to a more general measure of social
pretense. At the very least, such inconsistent relationships suggest
that SPP does not reliably improve ToM.
Nonetheless, a single-time-point correlational study is not an
ideal design for inferring causality. Lagged designs, although
imperfect, are better, and some longitudinal studies have
found evidence for a causal relationship. One found that
children’s SPP at 33 months predicted ToM at 40 months
(Youngblade and Dunn, 1995). Another with four time points
and several different measures of PP and SPP found that certain
aspects of PP related to concurrent ToM and predicted ToM
over time (Lillard and Kavanaugh, 2014). However, not all
measures were related at all time points. For example, pretense
production at 24 months (in a social situation with the mother)
predicted ToM at 48 months but not at 60 months, and
sophistication of the child’s play narrative with an experimenter
at 36 months predicted (at trend-level) ToM at 60 but not
48 months.
However, neither of these studies investigated whether these
lagged relationships could be explained differently, namely,
whether earlier ToM might foster both SPP earlier, and ToM
later. In this case, it might look as if SPP at Time 1 leads to
ToM at Time 2, when in fact SPP at Time 1 was simply a by-
product of having more advanced ToM at Time 1. We know of
only one study that could shed light on this, by also testing ToM
at Time 1 (Jenkins and Astington, 2000). In this study earlier
ToM predicted later SPP, whereas earlier SPP did not predict later
ToM, suggesting that better ToMmight enable children to engage
in more, and more advanced, PP.
Although these findings are suggestive, the most solid
evidence for a causal effect of SPP on ToM would come
from training studies, in which some children experience an
intervention to promote SPP and then are compared to an
otherwise matched control group who did not. Indeed, several
such studies have reported that SPP training improves ToM
or related skills (Rosen, 1974; Saltz and Johnson, 1974; Fink,
1976; Saltz et al., 1977; Burns and Brainerd, 1979; Dockett,
1998). However, these studies all had significant methodological
shortcomings (see Lillard et al., 2013), including unmasked
experimenters who may have influenced posttest performance
and unequal adult contact between groups. A study designed to
rule out these possible confounds found no improvement in ToM
for children in a SPP training group (Smith et al., 1981).
In a recent study, Qu et al. (2015) reported that SPP
improves ToM, but given the training content, this conclusion is
questionable. In four, 45min sessions, kindergartners were read
books with distinctly ToM-related scenarios (e.g., a child has
a false belief about where her books are) and then acted out
the stories. Controlling for pretest ToM skills, children who had
this experience had better posttest ToM compared to children
in a free play control group. Although the particular training
experience described here appears to be effective in improving
ToM, the conclusion that, in general, children’s naturalistic SPP
leads to better ToM goes beyond the data.
Furthermore, we recently failed to show evidence for the
proposed simulation mechanism (Dore and Lillard, unpublished
raw data, 2013). We reasoned that if SPP helps ToM by
causing children to think about mental states, then SPP should
prime mental states, leading to a stronger orientation toward
mental states afterwards. In two studies, children played with an
experimenter for 10min. In a doll condition, the experimenter
guided children through a partially scripted play session focusing
on role play, cognition, and emotions with Playmobil dolls and
animals. In a block condition with a Magneato construction
set, the experimenter avoided using mental state language and
directed play away from any child-generated pretense. Before and
after the play session, childrenwere given a task designed to assess
their preference for thinking about people in terms of mental
states vs. behaviors (Lillard and Flavell, 1990). Children in the doll
condition did not describe people in terms of their mental states
any more than did children in the block condition. Although null
results should be interpreted with caution, this data from two
studies we conducted (N = 100) failed to support a mechanism
by which SPP might improve ToM: by causing children to focus
on mental states.
Overall, the evidence described here is not strongly supportive
of a causal relationship in which PP promotes ToM skills. (For a
more detailed discussion of studies up to 2013, we urge readers to
see the Theory of Mind section of Lillard et al., 2013.) Two other
possibilities should be given equal consideration: a third variable
underpinning both ToM and SPP, and reverse directionality, in
which better ToM skills enable SPP—making SPP one reason
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why ToM is useful. One longitudinal study finds this reverse
relationship (Jenkins and Astington, 2000), as described above,
and more studies should be designed to test this possibility.
Given the state of the research, why is it so often assumed
that PP helps ToM (Leslie, 1987; Flavell, 1988; Forguson and
Gopnik, 1988; Moses and Chandler, 1992; Harris, 2000; Lillard,
2001a; Bergen, 2002; Ashiabi, 2007; Wellman, 2014)? Researchers
might be swayed by what Smith (1988) called “play ethos,” the
strong belief that PP promotes development. When researchers
design, run, and interpret their empirical investigations from
the perspective that PP must help development, it seems
highly possible that their beliefs might unintentionally bias their
findings. We note that researchers who have found significant
correlations between PP and ToM tend to frame their findings
in the context of a positive effect of PP and the training studies
described here are clearly designed with this causal direction
in mind. Training studies designed to assess the reverse causal
relationship might train ToM and examine whether PP, or
sophistication of PP, increases. Longitudinal studies in natural
settings could be designed to be able to assess both directions
of causality, controlling for potentially related variables like
verbal ability. Finally, future training studies designed to assess
the potential causal role of PP in ToM development can take
care to avoid the methodological problems common in this
literature.
Why is the relationship between PP and ToM an important
one to pin down? Surely, even confidence that the causal view
is incorrect should not lead one to conclude that PP does not
have value in children’s lives in other ways, either to promote
well-being (Lillard et al., 2013), for relaxation (Hutt et al.,
1989), to promote positive adult-child interaction (Paley, 2005)
or even for fun (Power, 2000). However, embracing the idea
that PP promotes ToM without solid evidence is not beneficial,
and may even be indirectly harmful if such efforts detract
from undertakings with better-established effectiveness. More
and better research to clarify the relationship between these
complex activities will have important theoretical and practical
applications.
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